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ESSAY
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: THE NEED
FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION FOR BANK
SALES OF LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
RICHARD Y.ROBERTS*
RANDALL W. QUINN**
INTRODUCTION

More than sixty years ago, the Glass-Steagall Act erected distinct
barriers between banks and the securities business.1 At the same
time, banks were exempted from key provisions of the federal securities laws. 2 Over the last two decades, however, distinctions between

* Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
** Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
This Essay is derived from a presentation delivered by Commissioner Roberts at
the 1994 Fordham Law School Institute on Law & Financial Services conference
sponsored by Fordham University School of Law.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the SEC, other Commissioners, or the staff of the SEC. The authors wish
to thank Michael A. Lainoff, Counsel to Commissioner Roberts, for his assistance in
the preparation of this Essay.
1. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
46, 62 (1981) (stating that Congress intended the Glass-Steagall Act to separate banks
from the securities business "as completely as possible").
The key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act are §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, and 378 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Section 16 restricts the power of national banks to underwrite securities and prohibits
national banks from purchasing or selling securities except on the order and for the
account of customers. Section 20 generally prohibits Federal Reserve System member banks from being affiliated with any firm that is "engaged principally" in underwriting securities. Section 21 prohibits persons and entities that are engaged in
underwriting and certain other securities activities from receiving deposits. Section 32
prohibits management interlocks between member banks and entities that are primarily engaged in the securities activities described in § 20.
2. See, e.g., Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)
(exempting from certain provisions of that Act "any security issued or guaranteed by
any bank"); Sections 3(a)(4), (5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4), (5) (1988) (exempting banks from the definitions of "broker" and
"dealer").
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the banking and securities businesses have blurred. 3 This trend has
accelerated in recent times and is likely to continue.4
One unfortunate result of this blurring to the potential disadvantage
of investors is that similar financial instruments may be offered or sold
to a broad investor audience pursuant to dissimilar regulatory
schemes with different disclosure requirements. For example, banksponsored financial instruments, such as loan participations that function as investments, may be subject to regulation only under the federal banking laws. Consequently, these instruments are subject to
laws designed primarily to protect bank depositors and to maintain
the safety and soundness of the banking system and thereby avoid the
application of the federal securities laws, which were designed to protect investors.5
Complicating this problem, sellers often design new financial instruments partially with the objective of avoiding the reach of the federal
securities laws. Not surprisingly, when purchasers lose money, litigation often ensues. When faced with interpreting the scope of the definition of "security" under the federal securities laws, courts have not
always reached the correct result. This Essay focuses on the development of the law in the Second Circuit regarding sales of participations
in debt instruments as exemplified in two recent and important cases,
Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank' and Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc.7 In Banco Espanol, the Second Circuit
held that sales of loan participations to institutional purchasers are not
the sale of securities. 8 This holding effectively deprives all purchasers
of such investment vehicles, even non-bank purchasers, of the protec3. See Proposed Mellon-Dreyfus Merger: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 103-94, at 14 (March 2, 1994) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Levitt Testimony, MellonDreyfus Merger]; see also Jay G. Baris, Mutual Fund Activities of Banks, 10 Rev.
Banking & Fm. Services 41, 43 (1994) (noting the erosion of the barriers between the
banking and securities industries).
4. See Securities Regulatory Equality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 103-06, at 4 (April 14, 1994) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (almost 25% of U.S. banks are involved
in "some sort of brokerage business" (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Levitt Testimony, Securities Regulatory Equality].
5. See, e.g., American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. F.D.I.C. (In
re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation), 813 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that
"the interests of the banking laws (protecting banks) and the interests of investors
often diverge"). See generally Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-34
(1971) (discussing the history of pre-Act affiliation between commercial and investment banks); D.A. Howard, Note, Ownership of Member Banks by Mutual Fund Advisers Under the Glass-SteagallAct, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 691, 696 (1984) (positing that
Congress chose outright prohibition because regulation was unworkable).
6. 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
7. 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 425 (1994).
8. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56.
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tions of the federal securities laws. Although Pollack v. Laidlawwhich held that the securities laws cover sales to individuals of participations in mortgages'-narrows the applicability of Banco Espanol,
serious problems remain.
This Essay argues that purchasers of loan participations that function as investments should be protected by the federal securities laws,
whether the purchasers are individuals or corporate entities. The
problems created by the Banco Espanol decision are unlikely to be
solved either by voluntary reforms in sales practices or by regulatory
actions. A legislative solution is probably necessary to ensure that the
purchasers of such investment vehicles receive adequate protection.
I.

LoAN

PARTFICIPATIONS:

TRADITIONAL AND NEW APPICATIONS

A loan participation traditionally is an arrangement by which a
bank or other financial institution makes a loan to a corporate borrower and then sells all or a portion of the loan to one or more participants. 10 Courts generally have held that traditional loan
participations are not securities." The loan participations involved in
those cases, however, contained features that justify the courts' decisions. Typically, the participants were in the business of making loans,
and the sale or purchase of loan participations was only a part of the
business. 2 In addition, the arrangements usually involved only a
9. Pollack, 27 F.3d at 815.
10. See Jeffrey D. Hutchings, What Exactly is a Loan Participation?,9 Rut.-Cam.
L.J. 447, 448-50 (1978).
11. See First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919
F.2d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1990); McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395,
1399 (10th Cir. 1987); Union Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 885 (8th Cir.
1986); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc. 651 F2d
1174, 1181 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); American Fletcher Mortgage
Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting analysis used in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F2d
989, 992 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that loan participation was a security); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570,575 (S.D. Ohio 1989);
Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513, 518
(C.D. CaL 1986); Vorrius v. Harvey, 570 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see
Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263,
1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a loan participation is a security); NBI Mortgage
Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,066, at 91,800 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (suggesting that a loan participation might be a security); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,632, at 90,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same).
12. See, e.g., Marcia Stigum, The Money Market 1086 (3d ed. 1990) ("For years,
banks have sold, participated, placed, and syndicated their loans, usually, however,
only with other banks."); Deborah L. Threedy, Loan Participations-SalesOr Loans?
Or Is That The Question?, 68 Or. L. Rev. 649, 661-63 (1989) (identifying the reasons
for engaging in loan participations, including using the participation as a way to enter
a new market using a lead bank to make a loan in a geographically remote location,
diversifying risk, and obtaining a higher interest rate than is possible on a direct loan
due to usury laws).
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handful of participants.' 3 As a result, the prospective purchasers
could engage in one-to-one negotiations with the lead bank and, if
they wished, could perform their own credit analysis of the borrower.' 4 Finally, substantial collateral often was present.' 5 In these
cases, the purchasers had substantial bargaining power and the ability
to access information regarding the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Thus, it is hard to fault courts for excluding loan participations with
these characteristics from the definition of security, as such instru16
ments arguably did not raise serious investor protection concerns.
In the mid-1980s, however, a new market developed for sales of
loan participations. 17 High quality borrowers found it cheaper to borrow money through sales to investors of debt instruments, such as
commercial paper, rather than through traditional bank loans.'" In
response, money center banks sought to recoup part of this market by
moving into investment banking. 19 This involved the banks "get[ting]
13. The most participants in a case holding that participations were not securities
was 21. First Citizens, 919 F.2d at 512. See also McVay, 823 F.2d at 1396 (three participants); Union Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 883 (one participant); Gunter, 620 F.2d at 1111
(one participant).
14. See, e.g., American Fletcher, 635 F.2d at 1254 (participant "conducted its own
investigations of the project" and "retained the rights of a lender to demand foreclosure, preclude substitution of collateral, and prevent modification of [the loan's]
terms"); Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304, 1313
(D.N.H. 1980) (participant "had the opportunity... to seek an independent appraisal
of the assets which made up the collateral"); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust
Co., 468 F. Supp. 448,455 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (participant "had the right to make inspections and appraisals"); Union PlantersNat'l Bank, 651 F.2d at 1178 (stating that participant bank had access to finance company's records concerning the loan).
15. See, e.g., American Fletcher, 635 F.2d at 1255 (loan was collateralized by the
principals of the development of the corporation); ProvidentNat'l Bank, 468 F. Supp.
at 455 (stating that participant bank had 50% share in collateral); Robbins v. First
Am. Bank, 514 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that lender was provided
with type of collateral indicative of commercial transaction); FBS Fm., Inc. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,341, at
93,156 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (finding substantial collateral available to all participating
lenders).
16. See, e.g., Dennis Scholl & Ronald L. Weaver, Loan Participations: Are They
"Securities"?, 10 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 215,231 (1982) (arguing that application of securities law to typical loan participation is unwarranted, because participants have bargaining power and the ability to obtain access to information).
17. See Michael G. Capatides, A Guide to the Capital Markets Activities of Banks
and Bank Holding Companies 63 (1993) (noting that since the mid-1980s, the loan
sales industry has become a multibillion dollar business that has changed the way
commercial banks extend credit to commercial customers); Robert F. Kornegay, Jr.,
Bank Loans as Securities: A Legal and FinancialEconomic Analysis of the Treatment
of Marketable Bank Assets Under the Securities Acts, 40 UCLA L. Rev. '799, 826
(1993) (stating that market developments in the 1980s "altered banks' motivation to
sell loans, the characteristics of the loans being sold, and the makeup of loan
purchasers").
18. Stigum, supra note 12, at 1083.
19. Id at 1085.
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out of their old make-a-loan-and-hold-it business into a new business,
namely, the make-a-loan-and-distribute-it business."20
Perhaps the most important new development in this market was
the wider range of purchasers to whom this product was offered and
sold. Loan participations were redesigned to take advantage of the
fact that money center banks "have a wide range of contacts with investors: through their sales forces, they have for years been selling
investors bank products ..

.,

various exempt securities, and some pri-

vately placed securities," as well
as acting offshore as underwriters of
"a wide range of securities." 21 As a result, loan participations are being mass marketed to institutions that are not in the lending business,
such as mutual funds and pension funds, as well as to individuals. Because the purchasers are not able to evaluate the creditworthiness of
the borrower, these purchasers, in particular, need the protections of
the federal securities laws. Yet, as evidenced by the Banco Espanol
decision, courts have not fully appreciated these market
developments.
A. Loan Notes: The Banco Espanol Decision
Banco Espanol involved the sale of instruments called "loan notes,"
which money center banks began selling in the mid-1980s. The loan
note program at issue in Banco Espanol was promoted as an alternative to commercial paper.' The bank made short-term unsecured
loans to corporate borrowers, then sold participations in the loans,
usually in minimum denominations of one million dollars.3 Although
the bank remained the nominal payee on the loan, collected on the
loan, and distributed the proceeds, the purchasers' only recourse was
against the borrower.2
Potential purchasers were solicited, often on a daily basis, and offered a range of investment options with different maturities and interest rates.25 Entities that had expressed an interest in participating
in the program usually signed a Master Participation Agreement prior
to their first purchase.2 The bank only was required to furnish to
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1086.
22. The bank's promotional literature advertised that loan notes yield "15 to 50
basis points more than their commercial paper equivalents." See Banco Espanol de
Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1992) (Oakes, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 2992 (1993).
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 60.
26. The Master Participation Agreement stated, among other things, that the bank
was making no representation concerning the financial condition of any borrower,
had no duty to inspect the books and records of any borrower, and bore no responsibility for the collectibility of any loan. See Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2992 (1993).
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participants, upon request, publicly available financial information
about the borrower.
The purchasers included foreign and domestic banks, treasury or
money management portfolio departments of corporations, pension
and retirement funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and savings
and loans.2 7 The purchasers were looking for a short-term vehicle to
place excess cash and were driven by the maximum return available
from the investments offered.28 The loan note market presented a
range of largely fungible investment vehicles, with little opportunity
or incentive for an investor to conduct a significant inquiry.
After a borrower defaulted on over seventy-five million dollars of
loan notes, the plaintiffs in Banco Espanol filed suit seeking rescission
under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act. 30 The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendant bank misled them by representing that the borrower
was creditworthy when, they assert, the bank knew the borrower was
not creditworthy. Although a majority of the purchasers in the loan
note program were not banks,3 ' eight of the eleven plaintiffs in the
Banco Espanol case were banks. 2 This fact made. Banco Espanol a
poor test case, from an investor protection perspective, for deciding
whether loan notes are securities.
The district court held that the loan notes were not securities under
the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst &
Young.33 The Reves test "begin[s] with a presumption that every note
is a security."' That presumption is rebuttable if it is shown that a
note bears a "strong resemblance" to any instrument on a list of notes
that the court previously has deemed not to be securities, 35 or if the
court determines-looking to the four factors identified in Revesthat the note should be on the list. 36 The four factors are: (1) an
"examin[ation of] the transaction to assess the motivations that would
prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it;"' 3 7 (2) whether
the note "is an instrument in which there is 'common trading for spec27. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 57 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id.at 60.
29. See id.
30. See Banco Espanol,973 F.2d at 57-58 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
31. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 57 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
32. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 37
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2992 (1993).
33. Id. at 42 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)).
34. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.
35. This list includes: the note delivered in consumer financing; the note secured
by a mortgage on a home; the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets; the note evidencing a character loan to a bank customer,short-term
notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable; a note that simply formalizes
an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business; and notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations. Ma. at 65.
36. Id. at 65-67
37. Id. at 66.
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ulation or investment;' "38 (3) "the reasonable expectations of the investing public; ' 39 and (4) "whether some factor such as the existence
of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby
rendering application of the Securities Acts
40
unnecessary."
After considering the four Reves factors, the district court concluded that loan notes are not securities. First, the court reasoned that
"the overall motivation of the parties was the promotion of commercial purposes and not investments in a business enterprise."41 Second,
the court explained that the plan of distribution did not involve common trading, but rather was "a limited solicitation to sophisticated financial or commercial institutions and not to the general public."4
Third, the court noted that the contractual provisions of the Master
Participation Agreement put a sophisticated investor on notice that
"the instruments are participations in loans and not investments in
business enterprises." 43 Fourth, the court reasoned that the banking
guidelines, in the form of a circular issued by the Comptroller of the
Currency, create a "regulatory scheme" applicable to the seller that
makes securities regulation unnecessary."
The plaintiffs appealed the district court decision, and the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed an amicus
brief arguing that the loan notes at issue in Banco Espanol were securities. 45 The SEC acknowledged that courts had excluded traditional
loan participations from coverage under the federal securities laws.46
The SEC argued, however, that loan notes should be covered under
the federal securities laws. The SEC explained that "[t]raditional loan
participations have generally been taken by banks as an adjunct to
direct lending operations." 47 The SEC noted: "[In this case, in contrast,] [t]he non-financial entities among the purchasers clearly were
not acting as commercial lenders, and even the banks that purchased
38. Id. (quoting SEC v. C. M Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67.
41. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 43
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
42. Id.

43. Id
44. Id The court also held that loan notes are not investment contracts under the
test set forth in SEC v. W. 3. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Banco Espanol, 763 F.
Supp. at 44.
45. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 14-43, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7563), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2992 (1993). The SEC argued that loan notes should be evaluated under the Reves
test and that because the notes are securities under that test, it is not necessary to
reach the question of whether loan notes are "investment contracts." Id at 17.
46. Id at 4.
47. Id at 3
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generally did so not through their lending
departments but through
'48
their investing and trading departments.
The SEC's brief went on to argue that, contrary to the district
court's findings, each of the Reves factors pointed to a finding that
loan notes are securities:
The loan notes were purchased by the participants for investment
purposes-for the high rate of return they offered compared to
other instruments-and not as part of a commercial lending business or to facilitate an independent business relationship with the
borrower. They were offered and sold to numerous entities in a
market that meets the Reves Court's definition of "common trading
for speculation or investment," since the sales did not involve negotiations in which purchasers had the opportunity individually to verify information concerning the borrower. Purchasers would
reasonably expect that these loan notes, which were promoted in
language used in securities markets, and as the "equivalent" of commercial paper, were securities. Finally, there is no alternative
scheme of regulation, or other factor, that significantly reduces the
risk of these loan notes and
4 9 thus renders the application of the securities laws unnecessary.
A panel of the Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded by the
SEC's analysis and held instead that the district court had correctly
applied the Reves test.50
In a dissenting opinion, then Chief Judge Oakes stated that the
court's opinion "makes bad banking law and bad securities law, and
stands on its head the law of this circuit and of the Supreme Court in
Reves."' 1 He agreed with the SEC's argument that these loan notes
were not akin to traditional loan participations and emphasized that
loan note purchasers have far less information available to them than
do participants in commercial loans.52 Judge Oakes noted with approval the concurring opinion in Great Western Bank & Trust v.
Kotz,5 3 which stated that the hallmark of a commercial loan is the ability of lenders "to verify representations and take supervisory and corrective actions." 54 Here, in contrast, the loan note purchasers had no
access to full credit information and no opportunity to perform or to
receive a full credit analysis. Judge Oakes concluded, as the SEC had
argued, that application 5of
the Reves factors leads to a finding that
5
loan notes are securities.
48. Id.
49. Ia at 4-5.
50. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55-56 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). The court did not discuss the investment contract test.

51. Id at 56.
52. Id at 59-60.

53. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
54. Idt at 1261 (Wright, J., concurring).
55. 973 F.2d at 60 (Oakes, CJ., dissenting).
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The SEC filed another amicus brief in Banco Espanol in support of
plaintiff's petition for rehearing.5 6 The SEC's brief argued that the
court's decision
overlooked all of the indicia that these transactions were securities
transactions-that they were purchases of instruments marketed as
investments, bought by persons acting from an investment motivation and with only the type of publicly available information commonly available to investors, and bought in sales subject to no riskreducing scheme of regulation. In sweeping these considerations
aside, the majority has issued a decision that could call into question
the application of the securities laws in a wide range of debt
transactions.57
Thus, the SEC urged the court to apply the federal securities laws to
the loan notes.
The Second Circuit denied the petition, but amended the original
decision to narrow its scope in apparent response to the SEC's concerns. The decision, as amended, emphasizes that the court of appeals
was only ruling "with respect to the loan participations as marketed in
this case" and that "even if an underlying instrument is not a security,
the manner in which participations in that instrument are used,
pooled, or marketed might establish that such participations are securities."5 8 The amended decision also states that the loan notes were
not sold to the general public, "thus limiting eligible buyers5 9to those
with the capacity to acquire information about the debtor. 1
Despite this narrowing of Banco Espanol's scope, major problems
remain for investor protection. The court's apparent premise is that
debt instruments sold to institutional purchasers are not securities if
the purchasers have the theoretical ability to obtain credit information. The court does not distinguish between banks and other types of
institutional purchasers. Whether a mutual fund or local government
pension fund purchasing debt instruments for investment is in fact
misled or defrauded does not seem to matter to the Banco Espanol
majority. But this does matter to the SEC, and it should have mattered to the court.
The plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, and the Court requested that the United States file a brief stating the government's
position.Y' Unsurprisingly, the SEC and the federal banking regula56. Statement of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellants' Petition for

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7563), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2992 (1993).
57. Id. at 7.
58. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56.
59. Id. at 55.
60. See Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 113 S. Ct. 1042
(1993).
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tors 61 did not agree as to what position the government should
adopt.62 While the SEC urged that purchasers of loan notes should be
protected by the federal securities laws, the federal banking regulators
adopted the position that the loan note market "has not to date manifested major problems that suggest a pressing need for further regulatory attention."'63 The brief ultimately filed by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the United States was not joined by the SEC. The Solicitor General's brief 6stated that the Banco Espanol decision is open to
"serious question." The brief, however, urged the Supreme Court
not to take the case because no circuit conflict existed, 65 and because
banking regulators "are considering whether to provide further guidance to the banking industry on loan-participation programs, including guidance on the information that should be made available to
purchasers of loan notes and other participations."'
Although the government's brief did not urge Supreme Court review, it did point out some of the investor protection concerns raised
by Banco Espanol. Specifically, the brief noted the changes in the
market for sales of loan participations67 and stated that these
developments
61. The federal banking regulators are the Department of the Treasury, including
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision.
62. Commentators also disagree on the question of whether the securities laws
should apply to the loan notes at issue in the Banco Espanol case. Compare Kornegay, supra note 17, at 850 (stating that securities laws should apply to the loan notes)
with John V. Murray and Anthony F. Vittone, The Banking and Securities Businesses
and the Recondite Line Between Them, 110 Banking L.J. 388, 420-21 (1993) (stating
that securities laws should not apply to the loan notes).
63. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992)
(No. 92-913), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2992 (1993).
64. Id.at 9. The United States argued:
[T]he court erred in the significance it attached to the fact that the notes
were sold only to supposedly sophisticated institutions, and not individuals.
The court also erred in concluding that the mere existence of banking guidelines for the purchase of loan participations weighs against the conclusion
that loan participations are securities.
ld.
65. 1I at 16.
66. Id.at 17. To date, the federal banking regulators have not published any such
guidelines.
67. See id.The brief noted:
[A]ccording to recent commentary, "the loans sold today are increasingly
obligations of noninvestment grade firms without access to the commercial
paper market.... Consequently, relative to investment-grade participations,
less public information is available to investors about the companies whose
debt is being marketed." Those developments have been accompanied by
changes in the way loan participations are marketed.
Id.(quoting Komegay, supra note 17, at 827-28 & n.90).
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may also further implicate the concerns of the SEC in ensuring that
the protections of the securities laws are afforded to those purchasers of loan notes who do not have adequate access to credit information and who may not participate in the market in the manner of
a lender that is in a position to make independent credit
determinations.68
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Banco Espanol case on
June 21, 1993.69
B. Pollack v. Laidlaw: A PartialRetreat From Banco Espanol
One year later, in Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings Inc.,7" the Second
Circuit had another opportunity to decide whether participations in
debt instruments are securities, and this time the court reached the
correct result.
Pollack involved interests in mortgages purportedly secured by
commercial real estate. 71 The mortgages paid a fixed return and contained maturities ranging from one to three years. The purchasers
were two doctors, one of the doctors' sons, the doctors' retirement
plans, and a family trust. For purposes of the appeal, the defendants
did not dispute that the plaintiffs were "passive, unsophisticated investors." The sellers were corporate entities in the securities and investment counselling business.7 3

The district court held that the instruments were not securities
under Reves.74 Applying the four Reves factors in light of the "framework" provided by Banco Espanol, the district court concluded that
the instruments strongly resembled notes secured by mortgages on a
home, one of the items on the Reves list of non-securities.75 In its
analysis, the district court recognized that under the second Reves factor, the instruments should be viewed as securities because they were
sold to members of the general public. The district court held, how68. Id.at 18.
69. 113 S. CL 2992 (1993).
70. 27 F3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994).

71. Id. at 809-10. Courts have been divided as to whether mortgage notes are

securities under the Reves test. See, e.g., Wright v. Downs, 972 F2d 350 (table), 1992
WL 168104, at *3 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that mortgage notes are securities under
Reves); Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, 736 F. Supp. 764,769-71 (W.D.Mich.
1990) (same), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Singer v. Livotti, 741 F.
Supp. 1040, 1043-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that mortgage notes are not securities
under Reves).

72. 27 F.3d at 809.
73. Id.

74. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5788 (PKL), 1993 WL 17302, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993).
75. Id. at *4.

2126

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

ever, that because the other three Reves factors pointed to the opposite conclusion, these mortgage interests were not securities.7 6
The plaintiffs appealed the district court decision, and the SEC filed
an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs.77 The SEC argued that
"this case is distinct from Banco [Espanol],that the district court unduly extended Banco [Espanol]beyond its holding, and that accepting
the interests sold in
as true the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint,
'7 8
this case are securities under the Reves test."
The Second Circuit agreed with the SEC's conclusion, and its opinion closely tracks the analysis in the SEC's brief. The court made
clear that Banco Espanol does not apply in a case involving sales to
the general public. The court stated:
The marketing scheme in Banco Espanol was more analogous to a
group of highly sophisticated commercial entities engaging in shortterm commercial financing arrangements than to the securities markets. In contrast, the record before us does not suggest that the
participations here were restricted to sophisticated investors
' 79 who
had "the capacity to acquire information about the debtor.
The court's opinion makes several other important points. First, the
fact that an instrument has a fixed return does not mean that purchasers lack an investment motive. The court held that it is "not even a
close question" that the plaintiffs had an investment motive, because
they
sought to invest funds in secure, conservative instruments. Most of
the instruments that such investors would take positions in, such as
investment grade commercial bonds, would have a fixed rate of return in the form of interest. Such bonds are nonetheless regulated
as securities. 80
Second, if the purchaser clearly has an investment motive, it does
not matter if the seller does not.81 Finally, the mere existence of another regulatory scheme applicable to the instruments does not mean
82
that the protections of the federal securities laws are unnecessary.
76. Id. at *5-6. The court also held that the mortgage interests were not securities
under the Howey test. Id. at *6.
77. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc. 27 F.3d
808 (2d Cir.) (No. 93-7993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 425 (1994).
78. Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted). The Commission also argued that the court
should apply the Reves test and need not reach the Howey test. Id. at 18 n.12.
79. Pollack, 27 F.3d at 813-14 (quoting Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1992)).

80. Id. at 813. The court also rejected the district court's reliance on the purported
existence of personal guarantees as negating the purchasers' investment motive. Id.
81. Id.

82. Id at 815. The court stated that the district court erred in holding that New
York state regulation of mortgages provides such an alternative scheme of regulation,
because the purchases and sales in this case did not involve "the usual process for
extending" a loan under state law. Id. The court also stated that the applicability of
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Pollack was an important victory for the SEC and, more importantly, for individual investors. The applicability of the definition of
security to debt instruments would have been severely and unduly restricted had the decision gone the other way.
Although Pollack purports to distinguish rather than limit Banco
Espanol,several of its conclusions in fact narrow the holding of Banco
Espanol. Both decisions are based on applications of the four-factor
Reves test. Although Reves does not state which factor is the most
important, the first factor (motivation of the parties) is crucial. It is
highly unlikely that a court would hold that an instrument is a security
if neither the purchaser nor the seller has an investment motive. Conversely, a court is not likely to hold that if both do, the instrument is
not a security. Difficulties in applying the Reves test have arisen in
cases where the parties to a transaction have differing motives, as was
arguably the case in Banco Espanol. Pollack is the first appellate decision to resolve this issue. The court's focus on the motive of the purchasers, rather than of the sellers, is critical. Because loan
participations are sold by entities in the lending business, the sellers'
motivations can almost always be viewed as commercial rather than
investment. Unless the purchasers' motives are given priority, participations likely would never be securities under Reves.
Pollack's conclusion that the mere existence of other regulation is
not enough to displace the federal securities laws is also important.83
The Banco Espanol opinion incorrectly pointed to the existence of a
banking circular as a factor weighing against the need for securities
s But this particular circular only addresses the steps that
regulation.8
national banks should follow before they purchase loan participations.
It does not directly apply to non-bank purchasers, or even to bank
sales of loan participations.s 5 Further, the circular is an inadequate
substitute for the federal securities laws because by its own terms the
circular does not offer substantial protection against investment risk,
nor does it provide purchasers with any remedies.'
Pollack correctly cautions courts not to invoke lightly the existence
of other regulation as an alternative to the federal securities laws
under the fourth Reves factor. Although the Reves opinion does not
explain the precise scope of factor four s7 the Court cited and appears
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21, was not a substitute
for the protections provided by the Securities Act and Exchange Act.
83. Pollack, 27 F.3d at 814-15.
84. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
85. See Brief of the SEC at 40-41, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific,
973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-913), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993) (discussing
Banking Circular 181, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, reprinted in Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60,799 (Aug. 2, 1984)).
86. Id. at 41.
87. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 69 (1990).
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to have drawn the factor from its prior decisions in Marine Bank v.
Weaver'8 and InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.89 The
certificate of deposit held not to be a security in Marine Bank was
guaranteed by federal deposit insurance, which the Court emphasized
"virtually guaranteed payment in full."" In Daniel, the Court stated
in dictum, after holding that the securities laws were not applicable,
that other federal law had removed the risk of misrepresentation. 1
These cases indicate that factor four should come into play only where
federal law provides comprehensive and strong protections for purchasers such that the investment risk is substantially eliminated. 2 The
existence of a banking circular, as in Banco Espanol,9' or remedies
under state property law, as in Pollack, is not enough. 94
C. Current Law: Dangers For Investors
Although Pollack points courts in the right direction, the problems
created by Banco Espanol remain for purchasers of participations in
loans and mortgages. Banco Espanol has not been overruled, and it is
the only court of appeals decision on loan notes. Therefore, currently
the law in the Second Circuit, the most important court of appeals for
financial matters, is that loan notes are subject to regulation only
under banking law, not the federal securities laws.
Banking law, however, does not provide purchasers with the rights
and remedies that would be available under the federal securities
laws. For example, purchasers of loan participations would have no
private right of action under federal banking law.95 In contrast, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides a private remedy for false or
misleading statements made in the offer or sale of any security.9 6 In
88. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
89. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
90. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558; see also Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d
622, 628 (8th Cir. 1992) (proclaiming that MarineBank applies only where regulation
guarantees a return on the investment).
91. See 439 U.S. at 569. Daniel held that a non-contributory, involuntary, defined
benefit pension plan is not a security because the plan fails the investment contract
test. Id. at 558-62. The Court went on to note that the specific issue in Daniel-his
continuous service requirements for pension benefits-had been dealt with under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Id. at 569.
92. See also Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 582
(10th Cir.) (the risk-reducing factor must "essentially guarantee the individual's investment"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991).
93. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. See Levitt Testimony, Securities Regulatory Equality, supra note 4, at 9-10 (citing authorities); see also Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme
Court and the Definition of "Security". The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract"

Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 489, 512 (1987) (stating that "because [federal] banking regulations themselves do not create a private right of action,
they are an ineffective substitute for the antifraud protections of the federal securities
laws") (footnote omitted).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
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addition, loan participations would be subject to private fraud actions
under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act,9 unless they qualify for that
Act's exclusion of certain types of commercial paper.9
But even if courts hold that loan notes are securities, purchasers
remain at risk. Under current law, banks that engage directly in securities brokerage activities are generally excluded from sales practice
regulation under the federal securities laws. For example, the Exchange Act
excludes banks from the definition of "broker" and
"dealer."99 These exemptions for banks were enacted more than half
a century ago on the assumption that banks were severely restricted
from participating in the securities business. 10° Today, in contrast, investors are increasingly likely to purchase securities directly from a
bank. Because the statutory exemptions of sixty years ago remain in
place, however, banks can conduct some securities activities beyond
the effective reach of the federal securities laws.
The consequence is that many regulatory safeguards designed for
the protection of investors do not apply to securities sold by banks. 10
For example, if a bank selling loan notes was not exempt from brokerdealer regulation, the bank's sales personnel would have to pass comprehensive examinations. Specifically, the bank would have an affirmative duty to supervise employees. 102 The bank also would be
required to follow rules relating to abusive sales practices, as well as
guidelines regarding the content of advertisements. 0 The bank
would be subject to periodic examinations by securities regulators,
and the bank would have to become a member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.' 4
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
98. See, e.g., SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that short-term paper may still be a security even though there is an exemption for nine-month notes). See generally Randall W. Quinn, After Reves v. Ernst &
Young, When Are Certiicatesof Deposit "Notes" Subject to Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, 46 Bus. Law. 173, 183-87 (1990) (claiming that the Reves dissent
was unpersuasive because it ignored the history of the Securities Act in concluding
that notes with a maturity of less than nine months are not securities).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1988).
100. The bank exclusions are a "historical vestige of a simpler time." Levitt Testimony, Mellon-Dreyfus Merger, supra note 3, at 4.
101. See generally Hearings Concerning the Proposed Mellon-Dreyfus Merger,
before the Subcomnm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 906-71 (1994) (statement
of SEC staff) (comparing the regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers
under the federal securities laws and federal banking laws).
102. See American Bankers Ass'n v SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 742 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[U]nder current SEC rules, persons associated with broker-dealers must pass SEC
examinations before they call sell securities.... [T]he 1934 Exchange Act itself imposes on broker-dealers an affirmative duty to adequately supervise its employees in
order to prevent violations of federal securities laws." (citations omitted)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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These safeguards are necessary to protect purchasers of loan participations that function as investments. Aggressive marketing of loan
participations to non-bank purchasers is likely to remain attractive to
banks. Because the Second Circuit may adhere to, and other courts
may follow, the Banco Espanol decision, it is likely that the federal
securities laws will not apply to these instruments. Certain purchasers-such as mutual funds and pension funds in which unsophisticated
investors have financial stakes-are especially vulnerable, because
these entities are not in the commercial lending business and may lack
the capability to evaluate the risks inherent in that business. The ultimate victims, when these institutional purchasers suffer losses, often
will be the individual investors who had interests in the funds.
II.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. Improvements in Sales Practices
A partial solution would be for sellers of loan participations voluntarily to provide more information regarding credit risk to prospective
purchasers, or at least to non-bank purchasers. Without this information, purchasers of mass marketed loan participations probably have
no realistic opportunity to evaluate the creditworthiness of a borrower. While additional disclosure by sellers may cause participations
to be more expensive and less competitive with other types of debt
instruments, it would prevent sellers from marketing a product that
potentially exposes purchasers to inadequately disclosed risks. Relying on voluntary disclosure by the seller, however, is probably not a
realistic solution to protect adequately investors from being misled.
B. Regulation
If sellers do not voluntarily provide adequate information, regulatory action appears to be the next logical step to take to allow purchasers of loan participations to evaluate properly the credit risk.
According to Banco Espanol, however, the SEC's hands are tied, because the SEC is confined by jurisdictional limitations if a security is
not involved. While the federal banking regulators could act, they
have not yet issued any specific guidance on the subject of loan participation sales to supplement the current inadequate pronouncements. 05 Moreover, any action taken by the federal banking
regulators is unlikely to eliminate the dangers to investors posed by
sales of participations because traditional bank regulation has a differ105. Although the banking regulators have recently issued guidelines and a superseding Interagency Statement designed to supplement their securities regulatory programs, the guidelines and statement "do not compensate for the omission of vital
securities law safeguards from federal banking laws and regulations." See Levitt Testimony, Securities Regulatory Equality, supra note 4, at 11; see also supra notes 66, 8386 and accompanying text.
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ent purpose than securities regulation. Bank regulation is intended to
regulate the safety and soundness of banks and to protect bank depositors; it is not intended to protect the purchasers of products sold by
banks.
C. Legislation
Thus, legislation looms as the only comprehensive solution. One
legislative response would be to amend the definition of security to
make explicit that the definition encompasses certain types of loan
participations. The difficulty, however, in crafting a statutory definition that works well in the fact-specific context of determining when
notes are securities should not be underestimated. Even if it were
possible to enact a new definition that is neither over- nor under-inclusive, the existence of the bank exemptions from key provisions of
the federal securities laws may still leave purchasers of bank-sponsored securities without needed protections.
The best legislative solution would be to amend the definition of
security and to impose a scheme of functional regulation, which the
SEC has strongly advocated for a number of years. 106 Transactions
that in substance are securities activities should be governed by a uniform set of rules, consistently applied by a single expert regulatorthe SEC-to all market participants, regardless of whether those participants are banks or securities firms."°
For this reason, among others, the SEC historically has urged Congress to enact a functional regulation bill.10 Among other things, the
SEC has supported legislation to
(1) repeal the blanket exclusion of banks from the Exchange Act
definitions of "broker" and "dealer";
(2) generally require banking organizations to conduct brokerdealer activities in separately incorporated entities, registered
with the SEC;
106. See Levitt Testimony, Mellon-Dreyfus Merger, supra note 3, at 3 & n.7 (citing

prior SEC testimony).
107. See Levitt Testimony, Securities Regulatory Equality, supra note 4, at 1-2.

[B]anks that engage in securities activities have the option of conducting
those activities outside the framework of the federal securities laws. As a
result, investors who purchase securities directly from unregistered banks
receive different standards of protection than those who deal with securities
firms.
The resulting regulatory structure gives rise to regulatory inefficiency and
duplication.... In addition, regulatory fragmentation prevents the [SEC]
from getting the comprehensive overview of the securities markets it
needs to do its job.

Id

108. See id. at 1, 3, 7. A bill adopting a functional regulation approach was introduced in the 103d Congress. See The Securities Regulatory Equality Act of 1993, H.R.
3447, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced November 4, 1993) [hereinafter Securities
Regulatory Equity Act].
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(3) delete the Investment Advisers Act exclusion for banks and
bank holding companies that act as investment advisers to registered investment companies;
(4) address a variety of confficts of interest that can arise between
banks and their affiliated mutual funds; and
(5) prohibit an investment company from using the name of an affiliated bank. 10 9
In addition, the SEC has supported legislative provisions to repeal the
existing exemptions for bank and thrift securities from Securities Act
registration (but not the exemptions for bank and thrift deposit instruments) and to consolidate within the SEC jurisdiction over periodic
reporting by banks and thrifts through repeal of Section 12(i) of the
Exchange Act." 0 Enacting such legislation would ensure that the regulatory safeguards designed for the protection of investors would apply to securities sold by banks.
Although hearings have been held on financial modernization in the
104th Congress, it is difficult to predict whether functional regulation
will be addressed (or any financial modernization legislation for that
matter), much less enacted, in the 104th Congress."'
CONCLUSION

Today's market realities call for an overhaul of the existing regulatory system for securities activities. Bank involvement in the securities markets is here to stay. One example of this involvement is the
bank sale, to a broader investor audience, of products that are called
loans, but that in economic reality are investment vehicles. Investors
may be at risk (as the Banco Espanol decision illustrates) if courts
incorrectly interpret the definition of security.
But even if courts recognize that the definition of security must react flexibly to changing market conditions (as the Second Circuit appeared to realize in Pollack), investors may remain at risk. Courts
may hold that participations are securities, but the bank exemptions
from the regulatory requirements applicable to broker-dealers may
mean that investors still are not provided with a single, consistent
standard of protection. The unacceptable result is that protections
vary depending on whether investors purchase securities (or financial
instruments that are remarkably similar to securities) from a bank or
from a registered broker-dealer.
109. See Concerning the "FinancialServices Competitiveness Act of 1995" and Related Issues: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and FinancialServices, House of
Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19, 20, 22, 23 (March 15, 1995) (testimony
of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
110. See Levitt Testimony, Securities Regulatory Equality, supra note 4, at 19-20;
Securities Regulatory Equality Act, supra note 108, at 14, 20.
111. Concerning the "FinancialServices Competitiveness Act of 1995" and Related
Issues: Hearingsbefore the Comm. on Banking and FinancialServices, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 15, 1995).
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Voluntary reforms in sales practices would represent a substantial
improvement, but are not an adequate substitute for the protections
provided to investors under the federal securities laws. Coordinating
regulatory efforts among the SEC and its counterparts at the federal
banking agencies may alleviate some problems, but cooperation
among financial regulators can have only modest success under current statutes that impose inconsistent or even conflicting responsibilities. Issuing new federal banking guidelines designed to protect, at a
minimum, non-bank purchasers of loan participations also would help.
The only comprehensive solution, however, is legislative action that
both amends the definition of security to include certain types of loan
participations and imposes a scheme of functional regulation as historically supported by the SEC. Unfortunately, it remains to be seen
whether such legislation will be enacted in the near future.

